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rinking water systems are vulnerable to
contamination by toxic substances, whether
the contaminants are introduced intentionally
during a terrorist attack, or unintentionally through
accidental cross-connections or backflow incidents.
In this paper, we discuss the particular
characteristics of distribution systems that make a
“systems modeling” approach useful and effective
in assessing, preventing, and mitigating water security
threats, and we outline the research needed to
develop robust models for water security.

Water Distribution Systems and the
Water Security Threat
Many characteristics of water distribution systems
contribute to a systems-level complexity: the large
spatial extent, multiple flow paths, and time and space
varying flow rates. Conceptualizing this complexity
is fundamental to understanding and minimizing
water security risks.
Water distribution systems are spatially complex.
Typically, they convey treated water to thousands
or millions of customers spread across tens to
hundreds of square kilometers through a looped (as
opposed to a branched) network of pipes. Thus,
there usually exist multiple flow paths between any
set of “upstream-downstream” locations, with each
path contributing a portion of the flow. Looped
systems increase the reliability of the water supply
through flow path redundancy, but also complicate
network hydraulic and contaminant transport
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behavior, which is dominated by the network topology
and bulk water velocity.
Water distribution systems are also temporally
complex. Water usage rates (demands) vary on
hourly to monthly time scales. The ratio of peak hour
to average system water demand over a one-day
period varies from 3 to 6 (Haestad Methods, 2003).
Most utilities use distribution system storage tanks
to equalize demand, thereby economically satisfying
the wide range of usage rates. Treated water is
pumped to storage at a more-or-less constant rate,
and excess demand or supply is accommodated by
fluctuating stored volume. Thus, flow rates are time
and space varying, and flow directions frequently
reverse, corresponding to changes in pumping policy
or water usage rates (e.g., storage tanks that were
filling begin to drain, and vice-versa).
System Vulnerability and Network Flows.
Source waters—rivers, reservoirs, and groundwater
supplies—are vulnerable to intentional contamination
because they are open and unsecured, and dilution
by large flow rates and volumes will likely limit public
health effects or require extremely large contaminant
volumes. The impact of contamination at the water
treatment plant intake or a unit process is also limited
by dilution, since maximum flow occurs at the plant,
and treatment processes themselves may also create
a barrier for some contaminants. Distribution
systems may also be vulnerable to intentional
contamination, though the level of vulnerability would
be system-specific.
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Can distribution system flows support high
concentrations of contaminants? The following
contaminant mass balance equation describes the
relationship between the concentration of the
introduced contaminant (contaminant source), Cs,
the contaminant volumetric flow rate, Qs, and the
distribution system pipe flow rate, Qp, and diluted
(in-situ) concentration, Cp,

⎛C
Q p C p = Qs C s , Q p = Qs ⎜ s
⎜C
⎝ p

⎞
⎟ or(1)
⎟
⎠

Note that there is an inverse relationship between
the pipe flow rate and the pipe concentration. If Cp
represents a concentration of health concern for
downstream consumers–for example, the
concentration such that an average adult drinking
one liter has a 50% chance of developing illness
50
(ID50), C p , or the concentration at which no adverse
effects are expected to be observed
NOAEL
, then one can derive
(NOAEL), C p
contaminant-specific bounds on the pipe flow rates
that could deliver such a dose:
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The above bounds should represent reasonable
minimum and maximum values, given uncertainty in
50
the various factors, and C p = ID50 × (W / L ) ,
where W is the assumed body mass in kg and L is
one liter.
Pipe flow rate statistics, thus, can be used as a
reasonable indicator of the vulnerability of distribution
systems to contamination. Figure 1 shows the
cumulative frequency of the temporally averaged
pipe flow rates for four different operating systems
(the plots are truncated at 100 gpm to highlight detail
at the smaller flow rates). (These four systems were
not subject to any form of pre-screening, and we
did not analyze any other systems.) Note that
between 60 and 80% of the average pipe flow rates
are less than 100 gpm.
If security is a concern, the potential of health
impacts from an intentional contamination by a given
contaminant can be interpreted by computing the
50
above Q p bounds. For a given contaminant, we
assumed 0.1 ≤ Qs ≤ 1 (gpm), 109 ≤ Cs ≤ 1011
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Figure 1. Cumulative frequency of pipe average volumetric
flow rates in four distribution systems.

(cells/L), 10 3 ≤ ID50 ≤ 10 5 (cells/Kg) or, for a 70Kg
4
50
6
body weight, 7 x10 ≤ C p ≤ 7 x10 (cells/L),
which together yield maximum pipe flow bounds,
14 ≤ Q p50 ≤ 1.4 x10 6 (gpm).
The above pipe flow rate bounds show that, in
the worst case, all four distribution systems may be
vulnerable to contamination, as the upper bounds
50
on Q p are large compared to, say, the 50th
percentile values of between 10 and 60 gpm. In this
case, there remains a significant fraction (30-60%)
of pipes with a flow rate less than the lower bound.
We caution that this analysis is rough; it only
indicates the potential for significant health
consequences without fairly assessing their likelihood
or severity.
Storage Tanks, Flow Path Travel Times, and
Contaminant Detection. Travel time characteristics
in distribution networks affect the transport of
contaminants from source to consumer, the
robustness of contaminant detection schemes, and
the post-detection time window for effective
protection of public health. Time series of water
quality indices, like those for free chlorine residual
shown in Figure 2 reveal the importance of travel
time characteristics. Figure 2 shows the variation in
free chlorine residual at four distribution system
sampling locations at one Midwest utility. These data
show that the free chlorine residual can exhibit
significant variability on hourly time scales, due in
part to the loss of process control at the treatment
plant, and in part to the interaction between travel
time and chlorine decay kinetics. Chlorine decay
kinetics combined with large storage tank residence
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Figure 2. Chlorine concentration variations over time at four
regulatory sampling locations in a Midwest utility.

time leads to large free chlorine loss within storage.
When such tanks drain as a function of demand
variation or system operation, low chlorine residual
concentrations sweep across the storage tank
service area, and any particular location experiences
significant temporal variation in chlorine residual.
More precisely, these locations are supplied at
different times by distinct sets of flow paths having
disparate travel time characteristics: a long travel
time set that includes the storage tank, and a short
travel time set that excludes it.
A comprehensive understanding of travel time
characteristics in typical distribution systems requires
system simulation. Here, we simulated “water age”
using models of three utility distribution systems.
Water age at a location is an integrated measure
related to path travel time: it is the volume-weighted
average of all travel times, over all paths leading
back to a water source (where the age is zero).
Typically, water age is simulated as a zero-order
reaction with unit reaction rate coefficient. We used
this standard approach, but we also prepared
simulations where all water in storage used a zero
reaction rate coefficient to highlight the role of
storage tanks in travel time variation. In this modified
approach, any water entering a tank stopped
“growing old” until it left the tank and again entered
the distribution system.
Water age histograms for the three networks are
presented in Figure 3, and graphs of node water age
statistics are presented in Figure 4. The latter figure
is a scatter plot of water age standard deviation, at
each location, versus its median value. These same
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statistics are also calculated for the water stored in
each tank, and they appear as squares to distinguish
them from consumer nodes. In each figure, graphs
on the left side exclude the effects of storage tanks
on travel time, while those on the right correspond
to the same network but include the effects of
storage.
The water age statistics show consistent trends:
storage tanks increase significantly the median water
age throughout the network, and dramatically
increase water age variability. Indeed, if it were not
for storage tanks, the seemingly common perception
that distribution systems are relatively static, save
for slow (seasonal) fluctuations in water quality, might
be close to correct. The large volume of finished
water stored in tanks, combined with relatively small
replacement rates, leads to high water ages in
storage. The contrast between high age water in
storage, and low age water delivered from the plant
(when tanks are filling), is the source of large
variability in water age and travel times.
The water age statistics relate approximately to
the time available prior to consumption of
contaminated water. A significant fraction of water
delivered to consumers—perhaps up to one half of
the total—arrives from the source within 24 hours.
Yet a significant fraction of water requires days of
travel time, due primarily to flow paths that involve
storage tanks. These data provide at least order-ofmagnitude time constraints on contaminant detection
and emergency response. Near complete protection
from intentional contamination may require rapid
detection and emergency response within hours, but
protection of a significant population fraction may
still be possible days after contamination. We caution
that these observations are a rough guide; in addition
to being system specific, they ignore chemical and
microbiological processes, proximity of population
to contaminant source, disease pathology and
treatment, and time varying flow paths and travel
times.
Real distribution systems exhibit variability in travel
time at all locations, and thus in water quality metrics
affected by chemical or biochemical reaction kinetics.
A travel time standard deviation on the order of days
should be expected within the service area of a
storage tank. If not treated carefully, such variability
can affect the robustness of contaminant detection
systems, specifically the frequency of false positive
and negative events. is just beginning, but one
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Figure 3. Water age frequency histograms for distribution systems 1 (left), 2 (center), and 3 (right). The travel time
impacts of storage tanks are excluded from histograms on the left, and included on the right.
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Figure 4. Node water age standard deviation (Ó2) vs. median (m) for distribution systems 1 (left), 2 (center), and 3
(right). The travel time impacts of storage are excluded from plots on the left, and included on the right.
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straightforward approach involves on-line sensors
that measure broad water quality indices, coupled
with simple statistical measures of signal excursions
from the expected value. Indeed, one existing sensor
that could be used measures free chlorine, relying
on its sensitivity as a sentinel to distribution system
contamination. The large variation in normal free
chlorine residual may, however, require large signal
excursion thresholds to avoid false positives, and it
may also reduce the effectiveness of such simple
statistical warning alarms.
beginning, but one straightforward approach involves
on-line sensors that measure broad water quality
indices, coupled with simple statistical measures of
signal excursions from the expected value. Indeed,
one existing sensor that could be used measures free
chlorine, relying on its sensitivity as a sentinel to
distribution system contamination. The large variation
in normal free chlorine residual may, however,
require large signal excursion thresholds to avoid
false positives, and it may also reduce the
effectiveness of such simple statistical warning
alarms.

The Role of Systems Analysis and
Simulation in Safeguarding Water
Supplies
Systems analysis and simulation enable an
integrated analysis of the distribution system, bringing
the spatial and temporal complexities together into a
flexible modeling framework. Systems analysis can
be used to understand the interdependencies of these
complexities, and thus to aid decision-making in the
operations of the system, and in the emergency
response to contamination incidents. Network
hydraulic models coupled with water quality models
can be used to simulate threat scenarios to assess
the potential impacts of contamination, and to design
and pre-plan for mitigation strategies.
To adequately simulate water security
contamination scenarios, many improvements to
current modeling capabilities are needed. These
improvements fall in two categories: improvements
to the basic models and algorithms and improvements
to application methods. Algorithms are needed that
better reflect the following physical and chemical
processes: mechanisms behind contaminant
adherence to pipe walls; contaminant interactions
with disinfectant residuals, disinfectant byproducts,
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and corrosion products; particles and biological
agents transport ; and the true time-dependent flow
characteristics (Uber 2004a). In addition, basic
research is needed to gain a better understanding of
biofilms and their role in protecting contaminants from
disinfection.
Application to Networks. In the post-9/11
environment, vulnerability assessments of water
utilities are considered highly sensitive and are not
widely shared. Distribution system networks may
contain specific information that should not be in the
public realm. (For a general discussion of securing
publicly available geospatial data, see Baker, 2004.)
For researchers to improve modeling capabilities,
however, it is essential for them to have access to a
broad variety of network data. There are at least
two solutions to this problem. First, methods could
be developed to transform networks visually so that
they cannot be readily identified. Second, a database
of “prototype” networks could be fabricated,
adequately reflecting the hydraulics and water quality
characteristics of real systems, but not representative
of any single existing system.
Probabilistic Applications for Quantifying System
Vulnerability. Because one cannot predict the
behavior of terrorists, an assessment of the
vulnerability of a drinking water system to intentional
contamination must consider a large number of
possible threat scenarios, or a threat ensemble
(Murray 2004). These scenarios may include
factors such as the type of contaminant, the
concentration and quantity of the contaminant, and
the location of contaminant introduction. System
vulnerability then is based on an assessment of the
entire threat ensemble. It is not obvious, however,
what constitutes a sufficient ensemble. How can
one determine the minimal number of scenarios that
should be simulated to obtain an accurate
assessment of a system’s vulnerability to
contamination?
A probabilistic analysis (e.g. Monte Carlo) of the
threat ensemble facilitates an understanding of the
likely impacts of a contamination event, such as
human health impacts (e.g., injury, disease, illness,
death), economic impacts (e.g., costs to the water
utility, interdependent industry and infrastructure, and
medical costs), and environmental impacts (e.g., longterm remediation). Accurate and up-to-date models
need to be developed for estimating each of these
impacts. There is a lack of reliable data on the
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behavior of certain contaminants in water, including
chemical and biological warfare agents, and their
impacts on humans from ingestion or other exposure
routes. For contagious diseases, dynamic models
of disease transmission must be developed to assess
impacts accurately.
Applications for Assessing and Mitigating
Threats. Table 1 shows the results of the probabilistic
application of a hydraulic and water quality model
to three distribution systems to estimate the likely
health impacts from a terrorist contamination of a
water distribution system. For each network,
between 100 and 1,500 scenarios were simulated.
Though the contaminant was the same for each
scenario, other parameters were varied to reflect
the uncertainty in the execution of the contamination.
For each scenario, a 55-gallon drum of contaminant
was introduced into the system, resulting flow paths
and exposures were analyzed, and statistics were
generated and examined. The contaminant was
assumed to behave like a tracer and to be resistant
to chlorine residuals, or to quickly deplete the
residuals.
Preliminary results show that this approach has
the potential to help water utilities assess the
contaminants to which they are most vulnerable,
identify the most vulnerable regions of their
distribution systems, and select the most appropriate
mitigation strategies for their system. The results in
Table 1 show that the same scenario applied to
various networks can have quite different outcomes,
thus the unique physical and flow-dependent features
of each distribution system weigh heavily on health
outcomes. However, the simulations show that “on
average” a low percentage of the population will be
severely impacted by contamination events (1-17%).
If particular nodes are protected, the vulnerability
of the entire system can be dramatically reduced.

Applications for Contaminant Monitoring,
Detection, and Warning. Early warning systems
consisting of online sensors, remote communication
devices, and data analysis tools are thought to hold
great promise in protecting drinking water supplies
from contamination. Probabilistic applications can
be used to simulate early warning system responses
to contamination and to test real-time early warning
system components under realistic conditions.
Algorithms can be developed to optimize the location
of sensors to achieve various goals, such as the
minimization of public health impacts (Uber 2004b).
Many basic questions about the feasibility of early
warning systems remain unanswered and realistic
simulations of early warning systems would help to
optimize their design and to determine how long a
utility has to respond after detection of the
contamination.
Such systems level models could ultimately serve
as emergency response simulators that could train
and test operators in their ability to rapidly respond
to contamination events. Applications of models
could also be used to design intervention strategies,
such as the closure of valves to isolate portions of
the network, or the superchlorination or
decontamination of pipes. Improved models would
enable the more accurate prediction of the spread
of contaminant as well as its decay due to chlorine
residual or treatment/decontamination.

Summary and Conclusions
Because drinking water systems are vulnerable
to intentional contamination by terrorists and to
accidental contamination from cross-connections,
their contamination is becoming an increasing
concern. In this paper, the spatial and temporal
complexities of distribution systems that make them

Table 1. Results from Monte Carlo analysis of three water distribution systems showing the average percentage of the
population receiving a non-zero contaminant concentration or an LD50 concentration at the service connection. The last
column lists the worst case exposure scenario.

Network/Population

Avg % Received
Nonzero Dose

Avg % Received
Concentration
of Concern

Worst Case Received
Concern Concentration
of Concern

1 (< 10,000)
2 (> 100,000)
3 (>100,000)

99%
75%
60%

17%
1%
1%

54%
4%
6%
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particularly vulnerable to contamination are
presented and discussed. In addition, the utility of a
systems modeling approach in assessing, preventing,
and mitigating water security threats is discussed.
Research needs for better models and application
capabilities are highlighted.
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